Applicability of the principle of insignificance to environmental crimes: contributions from the foundation of fundamental rights to judicial provision

Abstract

The jurisdictional provision has faced persistent challenges, especially with the incorporation, in recent decades, of legal principles among its interpretative and decision-making foundations. These difficulties become evident in the face of controversies and contradictions in the application of the same principle—sometimes even in similar factual contexts—as is the case with the principle of insignificance. Its application becomes even more complex in the context of environmental crimes, where differing conceptions of the State clash, represented by the subjective and objective foundations of fundamental rights. A deductive approach is employed, with historical and monographic procedural methods. The study ultimately aims to systematize the analysis of existing contradictions in the various fields of application of the principle, concluding that it seems reasonable to advocate for a convergence between ecological protection and criminal rationality, with strict observance of objective criteria in applying the principle of insignificance—even in cases involving environmental crimes.

Keywords: principle of insignificance; environmental crimes; criminal jurisdiction; foundations of fundamental rights.